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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
claim that the majority's opinion extends the
obligation to testify before the grand jury to an
obligation to produce all physical evidence what-
ever its character. In fact, the Court's holding is
much more limited. According to the majority's
two-step analysis, the petitioners did not have an
expectation of privacy in the physical charac-
teristics of their voice and handwriting exemplars.
No language in the opinion hints at an extension
beyond these types of evidence to such things as
personal papers; in fact, the majority reaffirms
the application of the fourth amendment to a sub-
poena duces tecum which is overbroadly drawn.
Thus, Stewart's two-step test in substance com-
ports with Justice Marshall's theory that the type
of evidence sought before the grand jury should
govern the safeguards provided. Both agree that
when the zone of privacy is invaded, the govern-
ment must make a showing of reasonableness
before a grand jury can compel the production of
physical evidence. The disagreement occurred
primarily over whether there was an exception of
privacy in the instant cases.
The clash between the Court and Justices
Marshall and Douglas indicates a continuing re-
examination by the Court of the status of the
grand jury in the criminal justice system. Both the
majority and minority realized that the invaluable
investigatory and screening functions of the grand
jury do not justify abridging a witness' constitu-
tional rights. In fact, such abridgement directly
contradicts the traditional role of the grand jury.
The grand jury was originally conceived to protect
an accused person from political harassment by
the government. It was assigned special powers to
subpoena witnesses and documents and operate
without the limitation imposed on trial courts.
However, overzealous and politically motivated
prosecutors have used the grand jury's authority
to badger suspects. Consequently, Supreme Court
decisions which increase grand jury powers must
also consider their abusive potential in the hands
of prosecutors.
Both sides agreed that the traditional view of
the grand jury as an independent body interposed
between accused and accusor may no longer be
realistic. s The Court emphasized, however, as it
did in Kasligar v. United States39 and Branzburg v.
Hays,40 the necessity for grand juries to have wide
powers so that "the public's interest in the fair
and expeditious administration of the criminal
laws" 41 is protected, while the dissenters empha-
sized the possibility that prosecutorial abuse will
occur unless grand jury processes are carefully
scrutinized.
If the holding in Dionisio and Mara is limited to
voice and handwriting exemplars and fingerprints,
as Justice Stewart's opinion indicated, the spectre
of abuse raised by the dissenters seems remote,
since evidence in which a witness has a real ex-
pectation of privacy will remain obtainable only
with a showing of reasonableness. If, however, the
legal principle established in Dionisio and Mara
expands to other types of physical evidence where
there is a legitimate expectation of privacy, then
the independence of the grand jury which both
sides seek to preserve will be threatened by prose-
cutors who will be tempted to use grand juries to
avoid fourth amendment reasonableness showings.
38 Id.
v' 406 U.S. 441 (1972).40 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
'410 U.S. at 17.
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Consent to Search:
Schnecdoth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
In Schneckloth v. Buslamontel the Supreme Court
held that consent to a police search is valid when
voluntarily given even though the subject of the
search may be unaware of his fourth amendment
right to freely and effectively refuse.
The defendant, Robert Bustamonte, had been a
1 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
passenger in a car stopped for motor vehicle viola-
tions. The police asked the occupants to step out
when the driver failed to produce a valid operator's
license. When asked if the car could be searched, a
rider, Joe Alcala, responded, "Sure go ahead." The
driver later testified that Alcala assisted in the
search by opening the trunk and glove compart-
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ments after an officer had asked, "Does the trunk
open?" Prior to this request there had been no
discussion of a crime and no one had been threat-
ened with arrest. According to the officer's uncon-
tradicted testimony, it "was all very congenial at
this time." 2
The police found several stolen checks in the car
and Bustamonte was charged with possession of a
check with intent to defraud. The checks were
admitted into evidence over the defendant's objec-
tion that they had been acquired through an un-
constitutional search and seizure. The resulting
conviction was affirmed by the California appellate
court. The California supreme court denied reivew
and Bustamonte did not appeal to the Supreme
Court. He sought instead a writ of habeas corpus
contending that his imprisonment was unconstitu-
tional due to the alleged violations of his fourth
amendment rights. The federal district court denied
the request. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit set the district court's order aside and
remanded the case to the district court to determine
if the consent had been a valid waiver of constitu-
tional rights.3 Subsequently the Supreme Court
granted the state's petition for certiorari in order to
determine what constitutes a valid consent for a
police search.4
Prior to Schneckloth, the Supreme Court had, on
occasion, reversed convictions for want of valid
consent. In Amos v. United States,5 the Court found
coercion implicit where the defendant's wife had
allowed the search after government officials an-
nounced that they had come to search the premises.
In Johnson v. United Stales,' the Court again held
that entry had been gained by submission to
authority after a narcotics agent said, "I want to
2 412 U.S. at 220. See also People v. Bustamonte, 270
Cal. App. 2d 648, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1969). The police
requested Alcala's consent for the search since the
automobile belonged to his brother who was not
present. The Court did not discuss the issue of third-
party consent except to observe in a footnote that such
consents have been found valid by the Court. 412 U.S. at
246 n.34. Justice Marshall in dissent stated that Busta-
monte, like Alcala, had standing to object. Id. at 278 n.3.
Presumably this was assumed by the Court.
3 Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1971).
4 Justice Powell thought that the real issue was the
extent to which federal collateral review should be
available to state prisoners relying on the exclusionary
rule. While he joined the Court's opinion, he devoted
his concurring opinion to the question of collateral
review rather than to the issue of determining the
standard for consent in a search and seizure context.
412 U.S. at 250.
5 255 U.S. 313 (1921).6 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
talk to you." In Bumper v. North CarolinaJ, the
Court held that a search could not be justified as
lawful when "consent" was given after the govern-
ment officials had asserted that they possessed a
warrant to search the premises. Such a situation
was "instinct with coercion."
In other cases the Supreme Court had upheld
convictions based on evidence found during consent
searches. In Davis v. United States,' the Court held
consent to search an office was voluntary where the
defendant was under arrest and being interrogated.
Several reasons were mentioned for the holding but
the Court stressed that the search was for gasoline
rationing coupons which remained government
property and which were subject to inspection at
anytime. The Court stated that duress would not
so readily be implied in such situations.9 In Zap v.
United States,0 the Court held that the defendant
had voluntarily waived his claims to privacy by
agreeing to permit inspection of his records in order
to obtain government contracts. In Coolidge v.
New Hampshire," the Court reversed a state con-
viction but stated that there is nothing constitu-
tionally suspect about consenting to a search in
order to cooperate with the police.
While the Court found, or failed to find, a valid
consent in each of these cases, it did not dearly
state whether consent need only be voluntary and
free of coercion to be valid or whether it must be a
waiver of a known constitutional right. Reflecting
the lack of clarity in Supreme Court decisions, the
state and lower federal courts have not agreed on
the standard defining a valid consent. 2 It was
7 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). The officials in Bumper
had a warrant but the prosecutor chose to rely on the
"consent" ratier than on the warrant to justify the
search.
8 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
9Justice Frankfurter dissented vigorously saying
that the consent was coerced since the agents threat-
ened to break down the door and since one agent was
attempting to force open a rear window. He also ob-jected to the finding of voluntariness from the fact that
what the officers compelled Davis to give up were
rationing coupons whereas the restrictions of the
fourth amendment guard the right to be free-of govern-
mental intrusion and should not hinge on the character
of the object sought. Id. at 600-02.
10328 U.S. 624 (1946).
11403 U.S. 443 (1971).2 In Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th
Cir. 1965), for example, the court held that the issue
was whether the defendant had understood that her
consent to a search of her luggage waived her constitu-
tional immunity from unreasonable search and seizure.
On the other hand, Justice Traynor in People v.
Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 753, 290 P.2d 852, 854 (1969),
held that the issue was whether the consent was given
in response to assertions of official authority; knowl-
19731
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against this judicial background that the Court
defined "consent" as applied in the search and
seizure context.
The analysis of the majority 3 in Schneckloth
began with two assumptions: a search authorized
by a valid consent is constitutionally permissible
even lacking probable cause, and the prosecution
has the burden of proving the validity of the con-
sent.14 In order to determine the meaning of "volun-
tariness" in a search situation the Court analogized
to its long series of cases involving questionably
"voluntary" confessions. In those cases the Court
assessed the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing the confession to determine whether it was
voluntary or coerced. Justice Stewart in Schneck-
loth emphasized that no single criterion controlled
but rather that many different factors caused con-
fessions to be held involuntary and therefore inad-
missible." The "totality of the circumstances" test
in effect balanced the recognized need for suspect
interrogation against the constitutional require-
ment that the criminal law be justly administered.
This rule balanced these needs by restricting the
questioning allowed.16
The Court in Schneckloth held that because of
similar considerations the question of whether con-
sent to a search is involuntary is a question of fact
edge of constitutional rights was not mentioned. The
court in Byrd v. Lane 398 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir.
1968), held that a consent to search was valid because
it was freely given, without promise or coercion.
13Justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the Courtjoined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun
filed a concurring opinion as did Justice Powell joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Jus-
tices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall each filed dis-
senting opinions.14 412 U.S. at 222.
16 Factors that were taken into account include the
nature of physical treatment given the accused, Reck
v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); the extent of his educa-
tion, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); his in-
telligence, Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); his
age, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); the nature of
the questioning, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944); the length of detention, Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940). See generally Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
16E.g. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515
(1963). Justice Stewart quoted with approval Justice
Frankfurter in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
602 (1961), on the test of voluntariness:
Is the confession the product of an essentially free
and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if
he has willed to confess, it may be used against
him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and
his capacity for self-determination critically im-
paired, the use of his confession offends due proc-
ess.
412 U.S. at 225-26.
to be determined from the surrounding circum-
stances; knowledge of the right to refuse is only
one factor and not dispositive of the issue. 7 The
Court appeared to reach this conclusion by balanc-
ing the legitimate need for law enforcement
searches against the protection afforded by the
fourth amendment. Factors of effective law enforce-
ment, including situations in which evidence can
only be obtained by a consent search18 or where
wholly innocent persons would prefer a consent
search rather than a search based on a warrant,
require the validity of consent searches. However,
these considerations often conflict with the protec-
tion against unreasonable intrusions which often
start, in the words of Boyd v. United States, "by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedures." 19 The balance is struck by
requiring the government to prove that consent
was voluntary (to guarantee fourth amendment
rights) while not requiring proof that the subject
intentionally waived his right to refuse (to facilitate
the practice of consent searches)3.'
The defendant argued that the problem of prov-
ing a knowledgeable consent would be obviated to
a great extent by advising the subject of the search
of his right to refuse. The Court, however, specifi-
cally refused to require this practice or even to
recommend it, stating that this suggestion had
been almost unanimously rejected by federal and
state courts. It emphasized that it would be im-
practical to require "the detailed requirements of
an effective warning" 2 because consent searches
usually occur in informal, "on-the-scene" situa-
tions as opposed to the trial atmosphere or cus-
todial interrogation in which defendants are ad-
vised of their rights." Thus Schneckloth restricted
17 412 U.S. at 227.
8 justice Stewart suggested that Schneckloth itself
is an example in which evidence was obtained when the
police had no warrant and lacked probable cause. Id.
at 227-28.
19 Id. at 228. (Stewart, J., quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
20 Justice Marshall rejected this balancing test near
the end of his dissent:
[T]he Court now sanctions a game of blindman's
buff, in which the police always have the upper
hand, for the sake of nothing more than the con-
venience of the police.... The Framers of the
Fourth Amendment struck the balance against this
sort of convenience and in favor of certain basic
civil rights. It is not for this Court to restrike that
balance because of its own views of the needs of
law enforcement officers.
412 U.S. at 289-90.
1 Id. at 231.
12 Id. at 232, 245. Justice Marshall rejected Stewart's
[Vol. 64
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the warnings required by Miranda v. ArizonaP to
the interrogation setting, holding them to be inap-
plicable to rights developed by the fourth amend-
ment.
Justice Stewart also stated that prior search and
seizure cases support the conclusion that a consent
search is valid when given voluntarily and not as
the result of express or implied coercion. He inter-
preted Davis v. United States24 to show that many
factors were considered in finding a valid consent 22
Bumper v. North Carolina;6 was seen as an implicit
recognition that knowledge of a right to refuse is
not a prerequisite when a search is granted in sub-
mission to a claim of lawful authority.Y Thus both
the traditional concept of voluntariness in con-
fession and consent search cases and the policy
considerations behind those decisions were urged
by the Court as reasons why awareness of fourth
amendment rights is not an essential requirement
of an effective consent.H
The issue of whether consent to a search neces-
sarily involves a waiver of constitutional rights
was discussed at length by Justice Stewart.2 9 He
concluded that the protections afforded by the
fourth amendment are vastly different from those
afforded by the fifth and sixth amendments. The
latter two amendments protect rights guaranteed
assumption that a warning would detrimentally alter
the informality of the circumstances surrounding a
request for consent stating that reported cases in which
the subject was informed of his right to refuse consent
show that nothing disastrous happened. See also
Thompson, The Supreme Court and the Criminalist: a
Coining Decade of Criminal Law Revolution, in LAW
ENZORCEMENT SCINCE An TECHNOLOGY 981, 982 (S.
Yefsky ed. 1967).384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda held that a suspect
in custody must be warned of the right to remain silent
and the right to have counsel present during any ques-
tioning.
24328 U.S. 582 (1946).26These factors included the nature of the area
searched, the time of day, the existence of the right to
inspect the coupons, the nature of the request, and the
brevity of the refusal period. Justice Stewart did not
mention the emphasis that the Court in Davis placed
on the government's ownership of the coupons.
26391 U.S. 543 (1968).
27 Justice Stewart cited but did not discuss Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946); and Amos v. United States,
255 U.S. 313 (1921), in support of this assertion.
n 412 U.S. at 234. Justice Stewart's references to the
dissent's assumption that a consent must be an under-
standing waiver of fourth amendment rights indicate
rather clearly his attitude toward that assumption.
At various places he labeled the waiver standard a
"talismanic definition," Id. at 224; a "sine qua non,"
Id. at 227; an "infallible touchstone," Id. at 229; and
a "litmus-paper test." Id. at 230.
m Id. at 235-46.
to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair
trial. The protections applicable in the trial setting
include the right to counsel, the right to confront
one's accusors, the right to a speedy trial, the right
to a jury trial, the right not to be twice jeopardized
and the right to be informed and understanding of
all rights lost upon a plea of guilty.2 ' These amend-
ments also guarantee the defendant the right to
protect the reliability of the truth determining
process at certain pre-trail stages such as post-
indictment pre-trial line-upsE and custodial inter-
rogations.n
In contrast, fourth amendment protections do
not prevent unfair results in a criminal proceeding.U
Rather they guarantee freedom from unreasonable
searches and protect one's privacy against arbi-
trary intrusions by the State.5 ' The fourth amend-
ment "is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of
truth," but it protects "quite different constitu-
tional values-values reflecting the concern of our
society for the right of each individual to be let
alone." 11 The distinction made between the protec-
tions guaranteed by these amendments to the
Constitution indicates that the difference between
the non-custodial/pre-indictment settings as
opposed to the "critical stage" settings continues
to be significant for the Court.2
Justice Stewart gave two additional reasons for
not requiring proof of an understanding waiver of
the right to refuse permission for a police search.17
He stated that such a waiver would be extremely
difficult to prove, even in cases where the search
was completely voluntary. A defendant could
"effectively frustrate the introduction into evi-
dence of the fruits of a search by simply failing to
20 Id.21See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (right to
counsel at such line-ups).
See note 23 supra.
3 412 U.S. at 242. Justice Powell in his concurring
opinion also acceted the distinction between "trial
rights" and the right to be free of unreasonable searches.
"Prisoners raising Fourth Amendment claims collater-
ally usually are quitejustly detained." Id. at 258.
24See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
U' 412 U.S.at 242. (Stewart, J., citing Tehan v. United
States ex rel. Schott,:382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966)).
6 See United States v. Ash, 93 S. Ct. 2568 (1973);
Kirby v. United States, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
7Justice Black defined such a waiver as "an inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known




testify that he in fact knew he could refuse to con-
sent." 's
The final reason for not requiring an understand-
ing waiver lies in the Court's assumption that the
police at the scene would be unable to determine
whether the consent was in fact understandingly
given; an examination necessary to determine the
suspect's comprehension could only be done by a
trial judge.' 9 Justice Stewart recalled that Miranda
had rejected the suggestion of inquiring of the
defendant as to the extent of his understanding of
his right because such inquiries could "never be
more than speculative." 40 Therefore, Miranda
required that a warning be given to all persons in
custody. The Court in Schnecklotlh clearly feared
that for the same reason the requirement of a
waiver "would inevitably lead to a requirement of
detailed warnings before a consent search." 41
Three members of the Court dissented in
Schneckloth based on their belief that consent to a
search constitutes a waiver of constitutional rights
which requires an intentional relinquishment of a
known right.42 Justice Marshall stated that an
uninformed consent is just as unconstitutional as a
consent secured by police coercion. 4" The validity
of the consent depends on the understanding the
subject has of his fourth amendment rights.4 The
"8 412 U.S. at 230. But see United States v. Curiale,
414 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1969); Rosenthall v. Henderson,
389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1968), in which the prosecution
proved understanding waivers. Stewart called these
"rare cases." 412 U.S. at 229. Justice Marshall in dis-
sent suggested that there are several ways to show the
subject's awareness of his rights. Id. at 286-87.
1" Id. at 244.
40 Id. at 245 n.33 (Stewart, J., citing Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966)).
41412 U.S. at 245 n.33. While both Schneckloth and
Miranda accepted the difficulty of determining the
defendant's subjective state, the Court rejected the
standard in Schneckloth but preserved it by requiring a
warning in Miranda.
4The opinions of Justices Douglas and Brennan
were quite brief. Justice Douglas stressed that the
petition should have been dismissed since the district
court might have determined that the search was
knowingly and intelligently allowed. Justice Brennan
stated that, "It wholly escapes me how citizens can
meaningfully be said to have waived something as
precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever
being aware of its existence." Id. at 277.
"1The terminology used by Justices Stewart and
Marshall in stating the issue is indicative of their dis-
similar conclusions. Stewart: When is a consent volun-
tary? Marshall: Is a simple verbal assent a relinquish-
ment of the right to refuse? "Consent" implies a cer-
tain amount of control over events with permission
granted for the search. "Assent" implies acquiescence
and agreement to avoid trouble.
4 Justice Marshall disagreed with the Court's asser-
tion that its prior search and seizure cases were decided
on an evaluation of all the circumstances. He found only
subject who understands these rights has the
ability to allow or to refuse the search because the
search context is not inherently coercive.45 Justice
Marshall, therefore, concluded that a person could
not validly consent to an action that violated his
rights if he were not aware that he possessed such
rights.
46
Justice Marshall also objected to defining a valid
consent for a search in terms of voluntariness as
found in confession cases because the voluntariness
standard was developed to decide issues entirely
different from those arising under the fourth
amendment. The pre-Miranda cases cited by the
majority concerned compulsion which negated the
voluntariness of the defendant's confession. The
Miranda warning is significant not so much for the
information it conveys, but rather because the
warning itself will lessen the possibility that state-
ments by the defendant will have been elicited by
coercion. Since "no sane person would knowingly
relinquish a right to be free of compulsion," knowl-
edge of that right in confession cases is irrelevant.0
Four members of the Court joined the opinion
of the majority but also wrote or joined concurring
opinions.48 Justice Powell endorsed the test of a
valid consent announced by the Court, but he
emphasized that in his opinion the real issue was
the extent to which federal habeas corpus should
be available to state prisoners who seek to suppress
evidence based on the exclusionary rule.49 In his
two cases, Zap and Davis, in which the Court had up-
held a search based on consent and the decision in each
case, he felt, turned on special circumstances. Id. at
279-84 nn.5, 6, 8, 9, 10.
41 Id. at 281. Justice Marshall tacitly assumed that
anyone wanting to exclude the police would do so if
that person knew that he had a right to refuse. He
therefore strenuously objected to the idea that a case
could arise in which the consent would be held voluntary
even though the defendant had proved his lack of
knowledge.
"4I d. at 285. This raises the possibility of cases in
which knowledge of the right to refuse would not have
affected the subject's response. If the State could not
prove that the consent was understandingly given, the
exclusionary rule would apply even though, given the
attitude of the subject at the time of the request, the
search would have been allowed anyway. Justice Mar-
shall did not consider this to be a realistic possibility.
See note 43 supra.
11412 U.S. at 282 n.8 (MIarshall, J., dissenting).
41 Justice Blackmun concurred in a very brief opinion.
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist, wrote a lengthy concurring opinion.
Id. at 249-50.
49 According to Justice Powell, the issue of habeas
corpus availability in fourth amendment cases was
"the overriding issue briefed and argued in this case."
Id. at 250. Justice Stewart acknowledged that California
had urged the reversal of cases expanding the availabil-
ity of habeas corpus. Id. at 249 n.38.
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view fourth amendment claims seldom bear any
relationship to the prisoner's innocence. There-
fore, he would restrict such collateral claims to the
question of whether the prisoner had an adequate
opportunity to raise the claim in the state court.
This argument is premised on Justice Powell's
belief that the use of habeas corpus has been ex-
tended far beyond its traditional purpose of afford-
ing a means of ending unjust incarceration." Under
common law once the prisoner had been convicted,
the court receiving a habeas corpus petition could
only inquire into the jurisdiction of the committing
court; it could not redetermine the facts and
issues." Subsequently, the Court held in Frank v.
Magnum12 that federal courts may grant petitions
in those cases in which the state court procedures
are so ineffective that the defendant has no ade-
quate opportunity to raise his constitutional
claims. Nothing in the legislative history of the
present habeas corpus act, according to Justice
Powell, indicated any desire to expand the function
of the writ."
This over-extension has caused the subordina-
tion of important societal values including efficient
use of the courts," finality in criminal trials,55 the
minimization of friction between the federal and
state courts' 6 and the preservation of the doctrine
"Id. at 250. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Powell cited
several cases that expanded the availability of habeas
corpus. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969)
(collateral review of search and seizure claims are avail-
able to federal prisoners); Fay v. Nola, supra, (state
prisoners are not automatically precluded from raising
constitutional issues which the state court had refused
to consider because of the defendant's failure to comply
with state procedural rules); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953) (the right of federal courts to redetermine
constitutional issues is not a restricted right).
5"412 U.S. at. 253-54 (Powell, J., citing Bator, Finality
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HAnv. L. REv. 461, 446 (1963); Oaks,
Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64
Mica. L. REv. 451-56 (1966).
u2237 U.S. 309 (1915).
-412 U.S. at 273-74. The pertinent portions of the
habeas corpus statute are 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1966)
and § 2255 (1949).
54 justice Powell cited the 1972 Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Court showing the number of state prisoner federal
habeas corpus petitions increased from 1,020 in 1961 to
7,949 in 1972. The largest number for any one year was
9,063 petitions in 1970. 412 U.S. at 260 n.14.
"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24, 25(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure and Section 2255: a Comment, 112 U. PA. L.
Rv. 3'8, 383-84 (1964).
6 Powell quoted Justice Reardon of the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court as stating that of the
problems between the state and federal judiciaries, the
greatest is "the effect of federal habeas corpus proceed-
of federalism. 7 These problems should not be
tolerated because collateral attacks in search and
seizure cases rarely concern innocence. To the
contrary, the evidence in dispute is often highly
reliable proof of guilt."1 Justice Powell would there-
fore require that a habeas corpus petition raise
questions about the prisoner's actual guilt.59
Implicit in Justice Powell's opinion is a dislike
for the exclusionary rule. He criticized its failure
to deter illegal searches. 6° Since the rule fails to
deter in the normal course of criminal proceedings,
it would be an even less effective deterrent in cases
of collateral attack where the length of time be-
tween the search and the exclusion of evidence is so
great that there will be little if any association by
the police of the exclusion and the search." Thus
he would have held that petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus that claim only the use of illegally
gotten evidence should be dismissed by the court
receiving the petition."2
The significance of Schneckloth lies in the fact
that it defined the meaning of consent in the search
and seizure context." Contrary to earlier expecta-
tfons," the Court established that to be valid,
ings on State courts" which Reardon called "the humili-
ation of review from the full bench of the highest State
appellate court to a single United States District judge."
412 U.S. at 264 n.21.
17Id. at 259. Powell also stated:
In my view, this Court has few more pressing re-
sponsibilities that to restore the mutual respect
and the balanced sharing of responsibility between
the state and federal courts which our tradition
and the Constitution itself so wisely contemplate.
Id. at 265.
13 Id. at 258 (Powell, J. citing Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. Cur. L. Rnv. 142 (1970)).
"1 See also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 302-03
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217, 237-38 (1969) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
60"412 U.S. at 267 n.25. Although he criticized the rule,justice Powell did not call for its total abandonment at
the present time.6
1 Id. at 269. Justice Powell also reasoned that because
of Kaufman, the practical effect of the habeas petitions
is the exclusion of evidence from the "vast twilight
zone" of search and seizure law since evidence from
flagrant fourth amendment abuses will have been ex-
cluded by trial and state appellate courts.
6Id. at 273-74.
6Since Schnecklot did not involve consent given in
custodial circumstances, the Court specifically excluded
this issue from the ambit of the ruling. Id. at 240-41
n.29, 247 n.36. However, the Court may hive indi-
cated its view when it noted that "other courts have
been particularly sensitive to the heightened possi-
bilities for coercion when the 'consent' to search was
given by a person in custody." Id., n.29 (citing cases).
"Some commentators and courts interpreted Mi-
randa to mean that subjects of a prospective search
should be warned of their right to effectively refuse
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search consent need not be made with an awareness
and understanding of fourth amendment rights.
It is interesting to note that the test of voluntari-
ness adopted by the Court is very similar to Section
3501 of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 regarding admissibility of
confessions."
The decision demonstrates that certain distinc-
tions used recently by the Court remain important
for a majority of its members. The "critical stage"
concept of criminal proceedings has been reasserted
as a means of distinguishing those rights that
cannot be relinquished absent an understanding
waiver from those rights that can be abandoned in
ignorance without causing reversible error. In the
process the Court has said in effect that rights
guaranteed by the fourth amendment will receive
less protection than rights guaranteed by the fifth
and sixth amendments.
A problem in Schneckloth is that both the Court
and the dissenting Justices strained to buttress
their conclusions with the same few cases-cases
permission to insure the admissibility of any evidence
seized during the search. See United States v. Blalock,
255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Note, Consent and
the Constitution after Bumper v. North Carolina, 6 CAL.
W.L. R v. 316 (1970); Note, Consent Searches: A Reap-
praisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 CoLum. L. REv.
130 (1967).
5 Section 3501 reads in part:(a) A confession ... shall be admissible in evidence
if it is voluntarily given.... (b) The trial judge in
determining the issue of voluntariness shall take
into consideration all the circumstances surround-
ing the giving of the confessions, including.... (3)
whether or not the defendant was advised or knew
that he was not required to make any statement
and that any such statement could be used against
him .... The presence or absence of any of the
above-mentioned factors to be taken into account
by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of
the voluntariness of the confession ....
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
which are ambiguous on the issue since they did not
attempt to determine a standard of consent. It
would have been better to have relied less on stare
decisis and to have held instead that to the extent
that earlier cases required a knowing and inten-
tional waiver of constitutional rights, those cases
will no longer be followed.
The position of the concurring Justices indicates
that the question of collateral attack on incarcera-
tions based on claims of violations of fourth amend-
ment rights is far from settled. 61 Their opinions
also show a continuing dislike for the exclusionary
rule.6 It may be that this rule caused at least four
members of the Court to call for a restriction on
the use of federal habeas corpus by state prisoners.
As Justice Brennan stated in Kaufman v. United
States,61 the proposal to exclude those petitions for
habeas corpus based on alleged violations of the
exclusionary rule "brings into question the pro-
priety of the exclusionary rule itself."6 9 It may also
be that it is the dislike of the exclusionary rule that
led six members of the Court to sanction a volun-
tary consent standard for some constitutional
rights and a knowing and understanding waiver
standard for others.
66 Since the Court held that there was no valid fourth
amendment claim in Schneckloth, it declined to discuss
the question of habeas corpus. 412 U.S. at 429 n.38. In
his concurring opinion Justice Blackmun agreed with
views of Justice Powell but did not join his opinion
because he also felt that no valid fourth amendment
claim was offered. Although he avoided the issue of
habeas corpus in this case, Justice Stewart joined
dissenting opinions in Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217, 242 (1969) and in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
448 (1963) that opposed the increased availability of the
writ. See also note 48 supra.
6 412 U.S. at 267-69 nn. 24-27. (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). See' also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
394 U.S. 217 (1969).
69 Id. at 229.
Border Searches:
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2535 (1973)
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,' the United apprehending aliens illegally entering this country.
3
States Supreme Court confronted an issue of first
impression: whether, and under what circum- lance: (1) permanent checkpoints at certain nodal inter-
stances, the Immigration and Naturalization Serv- sections; (2) temporary checkpoints at various places;and (3) roving patrols. Id. at 2537. Almeida-Sanchez is
ice may conduct warrantless searches of auto- concerned only with the latter.
mobiles by roving patrols2 for the purpose of 3In 1971 "The Immigration and NaturalizationService located 402,126 deportable aliens .... Of the
'93 S. Ct. 2535 (1973). total, 317,882 or 76 percent entered illegally at points
2 The Border Patrol conducts three types of surveil- other than points of entry. Almost all (317,302) came
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Defendant Almeida-Sanchez was convicted of
having knowingly received, concealed and facili-
tated the transportation of 161 pounds of illegally
imported marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 176(a) (1964). The marijuana was discovered by
officers of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service who were conducting a roving border area
check of automobiles for aliens. It was undisputed
that the patrol had no search warrant, probable
cause or "reasonable suspicion" 4 for the stop and
subsequent search.5
At the time of the stop and search near Glamis,
California, the defendant was travelling west on
State Highway 78. The majority noted that the
road is essentially an east-west highway which
also meanders north and east near Glamis. How-
ever, nowhere does the highway reach the Mexican
border.6
In a brief majority opinion, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's con-
tention that the warrantless search and seizure was
unconstitutional under the fourth amendment.7 It
recognized that the search was not a border
search,8 but upheld its validity on the basis of
§ 28 7(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act,9 which permits warrantless searches of vehicles
for aliens "within a reasonable distance from any
external boundary of the United States." Regula-
across land borders-98.9 percent from Mexico." 1971
AiT'v Gm. REP. 151.
4For a discussion of "reasonable suspicion," see
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
5 93 S. Ct. at 2537.
6 The dissent relied on an oral stipulation in open
court and described the area of the stop in different
terms. It emphasized the north-south character of
Highway 78 near Glamis and noted that on occasions
the Border Patrol conducted roving checks of vehicles
on the highwaty. Further, the dissent stated that the
stop occurred 20 air miles north of the Mexican border,
while the majority pu- the distance at 25 miles. 93 S.
ct. at 2546 (White, J., dissenting).
7 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971).
8 The ninth circuit previously described border
searches as those "made at or in the immediate vicinity
of an international border crossing." Alexander v.
United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
den , 385 U.S. 977 (1966); accord, United States v.
McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1971).
9 Immigration and Naturalization Act § 287(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1952):(a) Any officer or employee of the Service author-
ized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney
General shall have power without warrant... (3)
within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States, to board and search
for aliens any vessel within territorial waters of the
United States and any railway car, aircraft, con-
veyance, or vehicle....
tions of the Attorney General define a reasonable
distance as "within 100 air miles from any external
boundary of the United States." 1 0 The majority
also relied on its prior decisions supporting the con-
stitutionality of § 287(a) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act with regard to alien searches."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 and re-
versed the decision. The Court held that in the
absence of probable cause or consent, warrantless
searches by roving patrols of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service violate the fourth amend-
ment right to be free from "unreasonable searches
and seizures." 13 Writing for the majority,14 Mr.
Justice Stewart could find no support for the con-
stitutionality of the searches in the Court's auto-
mobile search decisionsil nor in its administrative
inspection decisionsj 6 He also found no support for
the searches in § 287(a) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act.
The Supreme Court previously had held that
warrantless searches of automobiles were permissir
ble if made upon probable cause:
[T]hat is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
the circumstances known to the seizing officer that
10 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (1964), amending 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.1(a)(2) (1957).
"See Duprez v. United States, 435 F.2d 1276 (9th
Cir. 1970) (defendant was stopped at an immigration
checkpoint 67 to 77 miles from the Mexican border);
Fumigalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.
1970) (defendant was stopped at an immigration check-
point 49 miles north of the Mexican border); Miranda
v. United States, 426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970) (de-
fendant was stopped at an immigration checkpoint 60
to 70 miles north of the Mexican border). In all three
cases, the court held that § 287(a) of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act permits warrantless searches of
vehicles for concealed aliens within 100 miles of an
external boundary of the United States.
1 406 U.S. 944 (1972).
23 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
14justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall and Powell
joined in the majority opinion. Justice Powell also filed
a concurring opinion. justice White filed a dissenting
opinion in which Chief justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist joined.
15 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971);
Chambers v. Monroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
16 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972);
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S.
72 (1970); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523(1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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an automobile... contains that which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction. 17
This exception"' to the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment developed because of the mo-
bility of the automobile. Since an automobile is a
"fleeting target," a warrantless search, when based
upon probable cause, is less offensive than a war-
rantless search of a store or dwelling. In light of
this reasoning and the reasoning in the more recent
case of Chambers v. Monroney,19 the Court created
no new fourth amendment right when it required
probable cause for a search of an automobile by a
roving patrol of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service. In Chambers, the Court noted that
probable cause is the "minimum requirement for
a reasonable search permitted by the Constitu-
tion." 20
In Camara v. Municipal Courlt~ the Court had
permitted administrative inspections on less than
probable cause. Inspectors did not have to have
specific knowledge about a particular building, but
still had to meet a "standard of reasonableness." 22
This standard, which would vary with the munici-
pal program being enforced, would include such
factors as passage of time, nature of the building
and condition of the entire area. Nevertheless, con-
sent or a warrant based on such factors was neces-
sary before the inspection could begin. Roving
patrols of the Immigration and Naturalization
17 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1924).
The Court found that probable cause existed in Carroll
when prohibition officers, while on a highway frequently
used for transporting liquor, stopped and searched a
car upon faith of information previously obtained by
them that the car and its occupants were engaged in
bootlegging.
"1 Other exceptions to the warrant requirement are:
(1) a search incident to an arrest of the area within the
immediate control of the person arrested from which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destroy evidence,
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); (2)
a search of the outer clothing for weapons during a stop
and frisk situation to discover weapons which could be
used to assault the officer, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
32 (1967); and (3) the seizure of objects within plain
view of the arresting officer, Harris v. United States,
390 U.S. 234, 236 (1967).
"9399 U.S. 42 (1970). Chambers involved the warrant-
less search of an automobile after it was taken to a
police station. The Court held that the search was valid
since they saw "little difference between on the one
hand seizing and holding the car before presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other
hand carrying out an immediate search without a
warrant. Given probable cause to search, either cause
is reasonable under the fourth amendment." Id. at 51.
20 Id.
21387 U.S. 523 (1967). See also, See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
22 387 U.S. at 538-39.
Service, however, acted without warrant, probable
cause or consent. The searches were made solely at
the discretion of the officer on patrol and lacked
any judicial safeguards. In rejecting the govern-
ment's contention that the alien smuggling prob-
lem was so serious as to permit such searches, the
Court reaffirmed its holding in United States v.
United States District Court.3 There, the Court
noted that before a search is initiated, the fourth
amendment contemplates judicial judgment, not
executive discretion.2
4
After stating that neither its automobile search
decisions nor its administrative inspection decisions
justified a warrantless search, the Court then ex-
amined § 287(a) of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Act to see if there was any support for the
roving searches in the Act of Congress. The Court
did not question the power of Congress to exclude
aliens,25 nor did it touch the issue of the authority
of the Immigration and Naturalization Act to per-
mit warrantless searches at the border or its func-
tional equivalent. 2 However, it did not extend this
exception to the fourth amendment to the roving
patrols. On this issue the majority relied on Chief
Justice Taft's opinion in Carroll v. United States"
23407 U.S. 297 (1972). In District Court the govern-
ment argued that warrantless electronic surveillance
was lawful as an exercise of presidential power to pro-
tect national security. Nevertheless, the Court held that
the surveillance violated the fourth amendment and
ordered the government to disclose the overheard con-
versations. Domestic security is not an exception to the
prior judicial review provisions of Title -r and the
fourth amendment.
14The Court also distinguished the decisions in
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S.
72 (1969) involving a liquor licensee and United States
v. Bisweli, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) involving a licensee
under the Gun Control Act of 1968. Both decisions
permitted warrantless searches of federally licensed
buildings on two grounds. First, those cases dealt with
businessmen who accepted the restrictions of their
trade, while any individual was subject to a Border
Patrol search. Second, in those cases the searching
officers positively knew the premises contained liquor
or guns, whereas there was often no reason to believe
an automobile contained concealed aliens.
2" The authority of Congress to formulate American
immigration policy comes from U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8
which gives Congress the power "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." The first alien legislation was
the Alien Act of June 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 570, which au-
thorized the President to deport any aliens he deemed
dangerous. AuERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAws Or =
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1961). See also, Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
26The Court described functional equivalents of
border searches as established checkpoints at the junc-
tion of two highways that extend from international
borders or destinations of nonstop flights from foreign
countries. 93 S. Ct. at 2539.
267 U.S. 132 (1924).
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which *stated that because of national self-protec-
tion, travellers crossing international borders may
be stopped and required to identify themselves and
their belongings as lawfully entitled to enter the
country. However, those lawfully within the coun-
try and -using the public highways may not be
stopped unless a competent official has probable
cause'to believe they are carrying contrabandVs
By restricting itself to the question of the con-
stitutionality of roving searches for smuggled
aliens, the Court avoided the broader question of
the constitutionality of searches at the border or its
functional equivalent. 29 The Court approved bor-
der searches in dictum in Carroll,0 but never de-
termined the standard of reasonableness for such
searchts. As interpreted by the federal courts,
however, the border search is an exception to the
probable cause requirement of the fourth amend-
ment. It may be made upon mere suspicion and
neither a search warrant nor probable cause is nec-
essary.n The search must only meet a standard of
reasonableness." This exception to the fourth
amendment is based on the acknowledged difficulty
of policing the border."
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell is
important as an insight into what circumstances
may reate probable cause for a search for smug-
gled aliens. The majority required probable cause
for such searches, but failed to describe or explain
a situation when probable cause would exist. It did
not note whether there had to be specific knowledge
about a particular area or general knowledge about
any area near the international border.14 Mr.
Justice Powell, on the other hand, noted that in
certain "circumstances there may exist a functional
2s Id. at 154.
29 For a discussion of the constitutionality of border
searches, see generally, Comment, Border Searches-A
-Prostitution of the Fourth Amendment, 10 Aiuz. L. Rzv.
465 (1968); Comment, Search and Seizure at the Border-
The Border Search, 21 RuTGoEs L. Rnv. 513 (1967);
Comment, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment,
77 YAix L. J. 1007 (1968).
30 "Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an inter-
national boundary because of national self-protection
reasonably requiring one entering the country to iden-
tify himself to come in, and his belongings as effects
which may be lawfully brought in." 267 U.S. at 154.
31 See Shorter v. United States, 469 F.2d 61, 63 (9th
Cir. 1972); accord, United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d
821, 832.(5th Cir. 1972).
" Sec United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 132-
33 (5th Cir. 1972).3 See United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821, 832(5th Cir. 1971). See also note 3 supra.
11 In Camara the Court stated that probable cause
could be based on knowledge of conditions in an area
as a whole and not just on conditions in a particular
building. 387 U.S. at 538.
equivalent of probable cause to meet the require-
ments of the fourth amendment.' 5
Important to the discovery of a functional equiv-
alent of probable cause would be the particular
area where the roving patrol operated. Is it an area
where aliens frequently enter the United States
illegally or would a search of the area be a mere
fishing expedition? Another important factor is
the degree of intrusion on the driver of the automo-
bile. Finally, decisions of the courts of appeals
should be examined for prior judicial approval of
the type of search to be undertaken.6
In addition to dealing with the probable cause
requirement of the fourth amendment, Mr. Justice
Powell also considered the warrant requirement.
He rejected the government's contention that no
rational warrant procedure was available and pro-
posed the use of area warrants as explained in
Camara." Judges could issue such warrants for par-
ticular roads for a reasonable period of time. This
was especially feasible in light of the government's
admission that the incidence of "illegal transporta-
tions on certain roads is predictable, and the roving
searches are apparently planned in advance or car-
ried out according to a predetermined schedule." "s
While the majority chose probable cause as the
standard for a constitutional search by a roving
patrol, Mr. Justice White chose "reasonableness"
as the standard in his dissent 3 To meet fourth
amendment requirements, the search for aliens
must only be reasonable under the circumstances.
Neither probable cause nor a warrant are necessary.
He cited Terry v. Ohio,40 Chimel v. California,4 Ca-
mara, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,4
3, 93 S. Ct. at 2541 (Powell, J., concurring).
36 Other possible factors might include proximity of
the highway to the border, whether the highway touches
the border, frequency of alien smuggling in the area,
and the type of vehicle (e.g., camper, mini-bus).
37 In Camara the Court permitted warrants based on
conditions of the area as a whole and not just on condi-
tions in a particular building. 387 U.S. at 538. Mr.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Almeida-
Sanchez, did not mention such warrants, possibly be-
cause he joined in Mr. Justice Clark's dissent from
their use in Camara and See. There, the dissenters feared
that area warrants would destroy the integrity of
magistrates. They feared that warrants would be
printed upon pads of a thousand and would be identical,
except for street and house number. Magistrates would
then become mere rubber stamps. See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541, 554 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting).
3893 S. Ct. at 2544 (Powell, J., concurring).
39Mr. Justice White thought warrants were not
constitutionally necessary in searches for aliens by
roving patrols, although he did agree with Mr. Justice
Powell that they should be issued.40392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41395 U.S. 752 (1969).
42397 U.S. 72 (1970).
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